| The 9/11 Commission report: Back |
| Read what John McCain said about the 9/11 report. |
| I just picked up my copy of the 9/11 Commission Report. As I read it I'll give you some of my assessments, and I'll be asking some questions. Some I've already listed below. The report went right to the top of the best seller list so a lot of you who read this will have the report. Now that you bought it, take the time to read it & not only read it but read it with a highlighter in hand. Your going to find out a lot of things you didn't know. Things that may make you realize how vulnerably we still are. It may even make you change your vote. |
| 1. Why, after so much time has passed & we are in (As the Department of Homeland Security has said many times since the report was released) such extreme danger, haven't at least some of the recommendations been adopted? |
| 2. What is so wrong with the director of intelligence having a cabinet post & being in the White House? I feel that by being directly under the president he would have greater access to the president and wouldn't you consider that important? His job will be, after all, to consolidate information from all 15 intelligence agencies & report that information to the president. |
| 3. I hear some people in Washington saying that the post will be redundant. I don't see how. Right now there are 15 agencies all of which are headed by a director, what the new position will do is give a higher level person control over all of the directors. Thereby allowing central control of the entire intelligence community, information will be shared. Some things may not seem important by themselves but when put in context with other things may become important. |
| 10/27/04 and still no 9/11 commission recommendations have been adopted. |
| People wanting to learn to fly passenger planes but not worrying about taking off or landing (F.B.I.) might not ring a bell (Though I can't figure that one out yet.) but put in with other information that there may be terrorist cells already in the country. (D.C.I) & add the fact that al-Qu'ida wants a major attack on the U.S. mainland. (C.I.A.) add those two facts to Large amounts of money coming into the country from Arab countries (G.A.O.) and you start to get a picture. Money for an operation is getting to a cell in the U.S., people are learning to fly. You don't have to fly a plane just to hijack one. Never before have hijackers flown a plane, they have had the pilot do the flying. Al-Qu'ida has been known for suicide missions. (C.I.A.) Now it almost becomes clear what they intend to do. Add that to the fact that Moussaoui wanted to fly a simulated flight from Paris to New York (D.C.I.) Usama Bin Ladin likes to finish what he starts & the World Trade Center bombing didn't work & the building is as tall as it is and you have a possible target. No! nobody would crash a plane into a building. Didn't a small plane crash into the White House a while before 9/11? |
| 4. Why are they fighting for control of the purse strings? Shouldn't the man in charge have that leverage? Without the leverage that control of the budget gives, he would be just a figurehead. It seems that Donald Rumsfeld just doesn't want to give up that control. I'll bet if was given that post he'd change his mind real fast. |
| Below are some things that jumped out at me while reading the report. |
| l. Pg. 38 (Bottom of page - The President & The Vice President) George Bush sat in a classroom for 5 to 7 Minutes (While Vice President Chaney gave the shoot down orders.) |
| 2. Pg. 102 (paragraph above 3.7... and in the Congress) Shows that President Clinton was clearly worried & trying to get Congress to do something about the raising terrorist threats. |
| 3. Pg. 107 (last paragraph) The (Republican controlled) Congress neglected it's oversight duties on the emerging national security threats. |
| 4. Pg 108 (2nd Paragraph) Bill Clinton in directives in 1995 & 1998 reiterated that terrorism was a National Security Problem, not just a law enforcement issue. (I had been led to believe that George Bush was the one who said it couldn't be fought just as a crime. That's what the Republicans have been saying "We can't just depend on law enforcement. Terrorism isn't just a crime it's war." or something on that order.) Many steps were taken and Terrorist plots were disrupted & terrorist suspects were captured, but the U.S. did not before 9/1l, adopt the objective to eliminate Ben Ladin. (The Government didn't but bill Clinton apparently did, See # 8) |
| 5. Pg. 117 - 119 On August 20th. 1998 (President Clinton and his advisors had agreed to attack Ben Ladin camps in Afghanistan & a chemical plant in Shifa. Republican leaders Newt Gingrich & Trent Lott (House Speaker & Senate Majority Leader) at first supported the attacks but the following month Gingrich's office dismissed the attacks as pinpricks. Some Republicans started the "Wag the dog." theory and there was a lot of commentary of the timing of the attacks. (In fact I was receiving questions about this myself. I was in Bali and was asked many times by other tourists from Australia, New Zealand, England & a few other European countries what I thought. My answer was "No, Bill Clinton would know that the American people would see right through anything that obvious. If he didn't have proof, he wouldn't have taken action. The American people are some of the best informed & intelligent people in the world." Almost to a person they agreed with me. When I came home I found out how wrong I was about the intelligence of the American people. Many of my fellow Americans had fallen for the Republican smear machine's bull, many still are. |
| Bill Clinton's advisors knew the problems the President had but he told them not to worry about it. Burger recalled the President saying "that they were going to get crap either way, so they should do the right thing." Burger said he never felt any sense of constraint." (Bill Clinton did his job.) |
| Pg. 119 (last paragraph.) in the last week of August 1998, officials began to consider follow up strikes. Clark said the the President was inclined to attack sooner rather then later. |
| 6. Pg. 125 (bottom of third paragraph. (In July 1999 Bill Clinton issued an executive order effectively declaring the Taliban regime a state sponsor of Terrorism. In October a UN Security Council Resolution championed by the U. S. added economic & travel sanctions. |
| 7. Pgs. 128 & 129 (3rd Paragraph) Dec. 4th.1998 the C.I.A. included an article in the Presidential Daily Brief describing intelligence, received from a friendly government, about a threatened hijacking in the U.S. That same day Richard Clark convened a meeting of his C.S.F to discuss both the hijacking & antiaircraft Missile threats. |
| 8. Pg. 133 (2nd. Paragraph) Policymakers in the Clinton administration, including the President and his national security advisor, told us that the President's intent regarding covert action against Ben Ladin was clear: He wanted him dead. |
| 9. Pg.199 (2nd. & 3rd. Paragraphs) Clinton informed George Bush about the threats from Ben Ladin. Clark briefed: Vice President-elect Chaney, Rice, Hadley, & Powell on the terror threat. On the same day Burger met with Rice. None of the above remember exactly what was said. (On something as serious as terrorism they should have been taking notes.) |
| 10. 201 (Paragraph 2) On Jan 25th 2001 Richard A. Clarke submitted a memorandum on Terrorism to Condoleezza Rice. (Paragraph 4) The national security advisor didn't respond directly to Clark's memorandum. No Principals Committee meeting on al-Qaida was held until Sept. 4th 2001. Isn't our safety more important then that? |
| 10. Pg. 202 (Down to Starting a Review) Clark told Chaney that he should contact the C.I.A. & push them to get the proof they would need (that al-Qaida was responsible for the attack on the Cole.) to retaliate. (Clark didn't want to give al-Qaida the impression that they could attack us with impunity.) Clinton had felt the same way but since the C.I.A. wouldn't say that al-Qaida was guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, his hands were tied. |
| 11. Pgs. 204 & 205 (Bottom of Page 204 - 2nd. paragraph of pg. 205) Clark lays out a strategy, including if necessary the use of military action. Clark asks to be transferred out of counterterrorism position. He told the 9/11 commission that he was frustrated with the administration's lack of seriousness with the al-Qaida situation. |
| 12. Pg. 207 (Saudi Arabia) The Bush administration did not develop new diplomatic initiatives on al-Queda with the Saudi government before 9/11 Secretary of State Powell met with the crown prince twice before 9/11. They discussed topics like Iraq. not al-Qaida. U.S.-Saudi relations in the summer of 2001were marked by sometimes heated disagreements about ongoing Israeli-Palestinian violence, not about Ben Ladin. With all the information coming in & the fact that Ben Ladin was a Saudi, why not? |
| 13. Pg. 208 (Last paragraph) President Bush told the commission that before 9/11, he had not seen good options for special military operations against Ben Ladin. Hasn't the administration been telling us that Bill Clinton didn't do anything about Ben Ladin? If they couldn't why do they think Clinton could? As least he fired one missile at him. |
| 14. Pg. 209 (Last Paragraph) On May 9th 2002 John Ashcroft testified at a congressional hearing "one of the nations most fundamental responsibilities is to protect it's citizens ... from terrorist attacks." The budget guidance issued the next day highlighted, gun crimes, narcotics trafficking, & civil rights as priorities. (The F.B.I.s assistant director of terrorism) Dale Watson said he almost fell out of his chair because it didn't mention counterterrorism. Who is watching our backs? |
| 15. Pgs. 260 - 262 ( Paragraph 4) In an article in the Aug. 6th. (P.D.B) Presidential Daily Brief titled "Ben Landi Determined to strike in U. S." It was the 36th item briefed so far that year that related to Ben Laden or al-Qaida, and the first devoted to the possibility of an attack in the U.S. George Bush told the commission that he viewed the document as historical in nature since he already knew that Ben Ladin wanted to attack us. You mean he didn't notice "Ben Landi Determined to strike in U. S."? It was the first time he heard that strong a warning. Intelligent leadership? |
| (Paragraph 6) George Bush did not recall discussing that P.D.B with the Attorney General or whether Condoleezza Rice had done so. Since the brief didn't mention any specifics, no meetings were held to discuss the brief. Come on even I would have wanted to know where the information Ben Ladin Determined to strike in U. S. came from. I can think of a h--l of a lot of questions I would have wanted answered. Can't you? I hope George Bush doesn't play Chess, he really can't think very far ahead. |
| 16. Pg. 265 (Paragraphs 3 & 4) Acting FBI
Director Pickard said that John Ashcroft
told him that "He didn’t want to hear anymore about terrorist treats." |
| In sum. the domestic agencies never mobilized in response to the threat. They did not have direction, and did not have a plan to institute. The borders were not hardened. Transportation systems were not fortified. Electronic surveillance was not targeted against a domestic threat. State & Local law enforcement were not marshaled to augment the F.B.I's. efforts. The public was not warned. 9/11 report. |
| 17 . Pg.275 (4th Paragraph) DCI (Director of Central Intelligence) Tenet was briefed about the Moussaoui case in a briefing titled "Islamic Extremist Learn to fly." he was also told he wanted to learn to fly 747s & that he wanted to fly a simulated flight from Paris to New York, had paid cash for his flying lessons, was interested to find out that the doors do not open in flight. tenet said that there were no apparent connections to al-Qaida. What did our government need a blueprint? |
| The Bush administration says they're strong on Terrorism? |
| Director of Central
Intelligence George
J. Tenet's Testimony before the Joint Inquiry into Terrorist Attacks Against the United States |
| I still have more reading to do. I'll gat back to you. Al |